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**NETWORKING AND SYNDICATION PRACTICES
AMONG CANADIAN INFORMAL INVESTORS:
THE CASE FOR ANGEL GROUPS**

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ABSTRACT

Existing research has documented basic demographic facts about informal investors, and the essential facts about what they do. Beyond that, however, little is known. This paper reports on research about how investors learn about potential opportunities (mostly from business associates) and about investors' experiences of networking and syndication. Investors frequently invest alone but also invest as members of loosely-constituted networks or even more formally as members of established investment clubs. This paper documents networking and syndication patterns of Canadian informal investors.

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Introduction

Private investors (also known as “business angels” or as “informal investors”) are active in equity financing between the stages of owners’ personal financing and institutional venture capital or public financing. It has been estimated that private investors account for at least as much investment as the formal, institutionalized, venture capital sector (Wetzel, 1983). DeNoble (2001, p. 360) states that in the US, “business angels collectively invest more money in more deals than any other investor type”. In Canada, the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA, 1998, p. 89) identifies informal investors as the largest source of external early-stage equity capital for rapidly-growing enterprises. In addition, business angels provide non-financial benefits to new firms as well as acting as precursors to institutional venture capital investment (Madill, Haines, Riding & Orser, 2002). There is also reason to believe that informal investors help develop and sustain industrial clusters (Keeble & Wilkinson, 1999; Shane & Cable, 2002). As this market matures, recent years have witnessed the formation of relatively formal investment clubs or associations, especially in the US. Among the important trends occurring in the informal market, according to DeNoble (2001, p.360), is that angels are increasingly working in syndication:

|| *“Business angels are becoming more sophisticated. They are forming syndicates and allying with matching services to source deals and to evaluate and place investments.”*

In addition, VanOsnabrugge and Robinson (2000, p. 43) observe that:

|| *“The last few years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of angels who are investing as part of an investment syndicate [in the United States], an approach that allows them to collectively make larger and more frequent investments.”*

This trend to syndication has not been documented in Canada. Therefore, this paper investigates networking and syndication practices among Canadian informal investors. Do Canadian networking and syndication practices differ from those reported in the US and

elsewhere? If so, what explains the differences and what are the implications? In addition, networking and syndication differ with the essence of this difference lying in the degree of formality. Networking is often defined as the set of all links among people (Granovetter 1985, Katz and Williams 1997). However, according to Webster's New World Dictionary (Second College Edition, 1980, p. 1444), "a syndicate is an association of individuals or corporations formed to carry out some financial project requiring much capital". Both definitions allow for a wide variety of forms of networking and syndication. This paper explores the nature of networking patterns and syndication employed by Canadian private investors.

To address these questions this empirical paper begins with a review of previous studies then outlines the methodology employed here. The attributes of the sample are then described and the findings of the research are reported. The paper closes with a discussion of the results.

Previous Research

Previous work (Feeney, Riding and Haines, 1999; Duxbury, Riding and Haines, 1996; Watson, Riding and Haines, 1998; Riding, Duxbury and Haines, 1997; Duxbury, Riding and Haines, 1994; DalCin, Duxbury, Riding and Haines, 1994; Farrell, 1998; and Riding, Haines, and Madill, 2001) has established basic knowledge about Canadian angels. This basic knowledge includes that private equity investors are well educated and report considerable experience as investors. They tend to hold other full time jobs, limiting the time they can devote to their direct investments. They account for a considerable amount of investment in new growth-oriented businesses. Their investments are often at the earliest stages of business development, stages where it is usually most difficult for growing firms to raise capital from other sources and where it is widely-held that a "capital market gap" limits growth. Potential investors are approached often with a wide range of investment opportunities; however, few opportunities are well prepared for investment.

As more research findings with respect to private investors emerge, their importance is becoming better understood and appreciated, in terms of both financial and non-financial contributions to the development of growth-oriented SMEs (Madill, Haines, Riding and Orser, 2002). Although a substantial fraction of private investors prefer to go it alone, one emerging trend observed in the US setting is the establishment and success of formalized associations of informal investors. Several examples, listed in Table 1, illustrate this point.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Development of such relatively formal angel syndicates is not at as an advanced stage in Canada as in the US. However, relatively fluid highly informal networks exist in Niagara, Ottawa, and Calgary. The Kingston Angel Network, a relatively formal syndicate comprises eight investors, was formed in 2001, and has concluded one deal (as of April 15, 2002). Ted Chudleigh, MPP, for Halton, ON, (2002) has announced a goal of establishing 12 formal angel syndicates in Ontario by the end of 2002.

Networks are inherently different from syndicates and investment funds. This implies a hierarchy of network forms. At the one extreme are those investors who invest alone, yet still rely on contacts with colleagues and associates as their primary source of leads. In such networks, individual investors make their own decisions. At the other extreme are investment funds in which a general partner does most of the legwork and invests on behalf of the shareholders. The General Partners do much of the work and the investment decision is often arrived at by voting, with all members bound by the vote. At an intermediate position, are syndicates in which participants typically screen proposals together and make investment decisions separately. The work is spread among the members and all are involved to a greater or lesser extent. There may also be syndicates in which participants make investment decisions as a group. These intermediate forms are murky. They include a continuum of formal and informal

groups, some of which have dues, memberships, and other obligations; others are fluid and unstructured with variable membership and more casual interactions.

Most previous research has examined the profiles of private investors and their investment preferences; however, with a few notable exceptions (for example, Mason and Harrison, 1996 based on UK data), many other aspects of informal investment remain to be investigated. This paper examines on the role played by angel networks, syndication patterns, and other intermediaries in the Canadian informal market.

Methodology

To examine this topic, this work relies on results obtained from 11 focus group interviews held across Canada supplemented by questionnaire data involving 71 individuals, 51 of whom were informal investors. These focus groups were conducted with the cooperation of the CCIP (Canada Community Investment Plan) sites in Mt. Pearl NF (5 participants), Halifax NS (10 participants), Moncton NB (3 participants), Fredericton NB (9 participants); Ste. Hyacinthe PQ (3 participants), Ste. Therese PQ (9 participants), Waterloo ON (9 participants), Niagara ON (5 participants), London ON (6 participants), Canmore AB (6 participants), Victoria BC (6 participants). In addition to the targeted investors, a number of other individuals also participated in the focus groups. These included, for example, the ten participants in the Halifax group, most of who represented institutional venture capital firms and were not private investors. In addition, participants in several groups included representatives from local agencies and banks. Participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire designed to provide baseline data (available from the authors on request) in addition to taking part in the focus group interview (the protocol is available from the authors on request);

A total of 51 informal investors completed the questionnaire. Quantitative data from the questionnaires were analyzed using standard statistical methods. Focus groups were audio-taped, transcribed verbatim, and the resulting qualitative data were analyzed using NUD*IST

(Qualitative Solutions and Research Proprietary, Ltd., 1997), a recently developed technique specifically designed for rigorous exploration and analysis of qualitative data.

Research Findings

Profile of Participants

The 51 investors who completed the questionnaires and who participated in the focus groups had been involved in 142 deals during the last two years, collectively investing more than \$107 million in these investments. The average stake invested per angel of about \$750,000 per investment was almost exactly the figure that one would get if the figure of \$632,000 reported in Riding, Dal Cin, Duxbury, Haines, and Safrata (1993, p. 40) is scaled up using CPI excluding food (CANSIM Series P100284).

In making these deals, the investors reviewed a total of approximately 1,200 proposals per year (on average, about 24 proposals per year each), resulting in an estimated acceptance rate of approximately 6%. This acceptance rate is higher than the approximately 2.5 to 3% reported in Dal Cin, Duxbury, Haines and Riding (1994, pp.124-126) and by Watson, Haines, and Riding (1998, p.3). Investments tend to be local, with 68% of the deals being located within 50 km of the investors' home or office.

The investor respondents were well educated, with more than 44 percent of respondents reporting a post-graduate degree and another 24 percent having an undergraduate university degree. Forty-five percent of investors held professional designations, most frequently accountants and Professional Engineers. Chart 1 provides a breakdown of the responses from the question where investors were asked to identify their full-time occupation. The vast majority of investor respondents held other jobs. Investing and managing their investments was not their primary occupation. This observation holds implications for how much time informal investors can accord due diligence, post-investment management, and other aspects of private investment. In turn, this holds implications for the extent to which investors might rely on syndicates. Almost

all respondents (91%) were currently business owners or had been business owners at some point in their lives.

INSERT CHART 1 AND CHART 2 ABOUT HERE

The 45 investor respondents who reported when they had started to invest represent a collective total of 522 years of experience as investors, an average of 11.6 years. As shown in Chart 2, Canadian angels tend to be repeat investors in the informal marketplace; with more than 70 percent of respondents reporting at least one investment every two or three years with one-third of respondents investing several times annually. The number of investments is not too different from the results reported in DalCin, Haines and Riding (1994, p3): “

The informal investors surveyed for this study report having made an average of 4.2 investments within Canada and 0.6 foreign investments for a total stake that averages \$632,000 per investor (an average of \$126,000 per year per investor) over the 1968-1991 period”.

Together, the 51 respondents in the present study report having a total of more than \$47 million available “for the purpose of making private investments in Canadian SMEs” an average of slightly less than \$1 million each.

Charts 3 and 4 break down the sector and stage of investment distributions of the deals reported by investor respondents. While software deals were the most frequent investments, the average size of such deals tended to be small. Of the 142 deals, 60 (42 percent) were to businesses described as being in knowledge-based enterprises. Deals in the finance and real estate sector accounted for a disproportionate amount of the capital invested. Most investors reported deals in multiple sectors. Also, as has been found in previous research, investments were predominantly placed in early stages, usually at the seed and start-up stages. As shown in Chart 4, below, more than 60 percent of investors had invested at the start-up stage and 50 percent of investors responded that they had invested at the seed stage of projects.

INSERT CHART 3 AND CHART 4 ABOUT HERE

Role of Networks in Deal Flow

Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, pp.77-84) list ten ways, including personal and professional networks, by which businesses seeking informal investors in the United States find potential informal investors. However, they present no data on how commonly each of these ten ways is used. In the UK, Mason and Harrison (1996, p.107), studied LINC (Local Investment Networking Company), a well-established business introduction service in the United Kingdom, and found that it was a source for deal flow. A somewhat similar service in Canada known as COIN (Canadian Opportunities Investment Network) failed for lack of informal investor and business interest (Riding and Blatt, 1992).

In Canada, the primary means by which investors learn about potential investment opportunities is through referrals from business associates, a finding consistent with most previous research (e.g., Dal Cin, Haines and Riding, 1994, p.6). Many investors also noted that investment opportunities find the investor in Canada through the use of interpersonal networks. According to the majority of investor participants in the focus groups networks of professional contacts -- including accountants, bankers, lawyers and other investors -- are their primary sources for sources of deal flow. . Investors participants reviewed an average of 24 proposals per year each, with an estimated acceptance rate of approximately 6%. In the words of investor participants:

|| *“Its networking and who you know. When you’ve been around for a long time, your phone rings, you get business plans through people in the business community, bankers are frequently a good source...”*

|| *“Once you start looking, then word gets out and more things will start coming along... whether it’s the right thing or not, that’s a different story, but...even my accountant said look at this and look at that...”*

|| *“I get a lot of people phoning me, I guess they know that you’ve got some disposable cash – so I get direct phone calls from people I don’t even know, or someone has referred them to me. Or somebody I know phones me up and says ‘I think this is a good investment, do you want to take a look at it?’ Some calls are from people I’ve invested with before, some are cold calls.”*

“The ones I run into are generally referrals from business associates ... or a guy I’ve invested with before is interested in investing and wants to know if I’ll take a look at a proposal. For most of us it’s a matter of having more guys [investors] looking at [it] ...”

“It is word of mouth, it is networks, it is developments.... Maybe it is at a golf course, a service club. It may be meeting someone through someone or hearing about someone who does something and you phone them up ...”.

Syndication and Networking Patterns of Canadian Informal Investors

While most angels benefit from networking as a means of sourcing deals, not all investors are willing to invest as members of formal syndicates. Virtually all investors make extensive use of their networks, especially with respect to sourcing deals. However, the use of more formal investment syndicates was less common. Investors report four modes of operation with respect to syndication and networking.

- No Syndication. *Approximately 37 percent of respondents do not syndicate and state that they are unwilling to syndicate.*
- Occasional Syndication. *40 percent of investors reported that they syndicate some of the time, but not in all instances.*
- Syndication as a preference. *23 percent of respondents strongly prefer to invest as members of a syndicate.*
- Investing through a fund. *In Quebec, a number of “club d’investisseurs” have emerged. Described as investment funds structured with professional managers and many small silent investor participants, such funds seek rates of return of the order of 30-40% on their initial investments.*

This breakdown contrasts with both the UK and US experiences. Mason and Harrison (1996, p.110): report that in the UK, “in the majority of investments (71%) the investor invested alone ... that syndicated investments are relatively uncommon in the UK informal venture capital market”. For the US, Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, p.252) state that “The business angel market has already seen a wave of formalization with the widespread and growing

popularity of business angel syndicates”. Both syndication and solo investing offer advantages and disadvantages. To develop a taxonomy of both advantages and disadvantages, NUD*IST was used to examine the verbatim transcripts of the eleven focus group sessions.

Disadvantages of Formal Syndicates

While formal syndicates may be extremely valuable and play critical roles for many Canadian angel investors, four disadvantages of formal syndicates were identified by focus group participants. These included:

- Problems inherent in working with others on investment deals. *Foremost among these difficulties is the ongoing challenge of maintaining mutually acceptable valuations of the contributions of the various stakeholders. This is complicated by the fact that private investors usually make substantial non-financial contributions to the firms. For example, Madill, Haines and Riding (2002) identify six categories of non-financial contributions that business owners have associated with business angels. These include provision of advice, contacts, hands-on-management, involvement in Boards of Directors and Advisors, market and business intelligence, and credibility. These are each difficult to value and their value may vary over time and across investments.*
- Problems of differential expectations. *Not all investors in a syndicate will always agree about the time to exit or the means of exit. To the extent that exit can take various forms (buyback by founders, acquisition, venture capital round, IPO, business failure, etc.) expectations are likely to differ. As noted by Doyle (2002), “all deals are up for grabs when the bigger money comes in”.*
- Micro-managing businesses. *Given that angels are typically highly involved in the firms in which they invest, members of any given syndicate are likely to hold*

strong opinions which must be managed and coordinated. Often enough, angels make their investments so that they can take on active managerial roles.

- *Problems of managing groups of strong willed people.*

The following statements, expressed by angel participants, illustrate these elements.

“The idea was the group would put in money and we would look for deals. It just did not work because one, I find whenever I’m in with a large group ... that there is different amounts of effort put in and the result is that some of the guys within the group will work, some the guys will throw their money in and just complain. Depending on the project different personalities will come to the front so I don’t think that having a group set up and then finding the projects works. I think you find the project attracts certain groups, and the project may maintain their interest both in terms of dollars and in terms of input. But I don’t know of any sort of investments groups that really function well... maybe they are there but it hasn’t been within our crowd.”

“The other pitfall I have found in groups is that because you are attracting very successful individuals by definition, they all believe that they know their business. And because of that, not unlike doctors, they believe they have the divine right of knowing everything about every business. So now you have six or seven great entrepreneurs all deciding the menus of the restaurant you just opened up. It can be a nightmare – we’ve been through it, and we’re witnessing another group in town going through it. Yeah, with great delight (laughter). Yeah been there done that.”

“But as far as syndication is concerned I think the smaller the group the better. That’s my personal experience.”

“So it means either you continually expand beyond the initial group because there is a burn up factor in the person who is doing of an investment project. You get tired of trying to drum up investors and you can’t point to your last success because its way back there. “

Advantages of Syndicates

Investors identified numerous advantages of syndicates. Many of these are obvious (access to the accumulated capital of the group, ability to draw on more sources of advice and referrals, diversification of risk from the angels’ perspective). Others are less evident. For example, one of the benefits mentioned with surprising frequency is the social value of the syndicate. In the US, for example, the social interactions are clearly identified as a priority for such groups as Walnut Ventures (Wagner, 2002) and the well-known Band of Angels (Severiens, 2002). In this research, several of the angel investors at one site were clearly a part of an

informal network who enjoyed the process of working together. A number of investor comments show that this aspect of investing is really important to them:

“But one particular fellow has close contacts in other cities ... they sort of invite each other in and it's like a club and they have some great fun. They go in heavy in all kinds of different deals and they go and have a fancy dinner and laugh about it... and if it doesn't succeed they get involved and ... they have a lot of fun.”

“The investors in this group really have to have kind of the same culture. As Andy says, it's fun money for them. They were in it looking for a big deals and some excitement and ... all of those things. But they don't float around with a whole bunch of different partners they just have one or two partners and it's always the same guys in that group.”

The notion of having fun as an investor was a strong theme in many of the groups. Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, pp.117-118) report this element as relevant for informal investors in the United States. This concept was quite distinct from the concept of professionalism as an investor. Some investors believe that involvement of unprofessional investors can cause significant problems. The view of these investors is that unprofessional investors can cause more harm than good by establishing unrealistic valuations at an early stage and from the provision of bad advice. This causes problems for the more serious investors who typically come along afterwards and has to try to clean up the mess.

“The casual investor who not only does themselves a disservice but kind of clogs up the system as well in terms of moving things positively forward. As a result of some availability of that money and source I think that entrepreneurs often get off to a bad start so that it would be very nice if there was a mechanism to take the casual investor's interest in investing and make it professional. “

Syndications tend to be more efficient in terms of use of members' time by bringing in a mixture of backgrounds and experience. This allows due diligence to be conducted more effectively in less time. A related advantage is that syndication offers passive investors a means of making investments without having to accompany their investment with time-consuming mentoring and other forms of support. According to Norland (2002, p. 4): “These types [passive investors] of investors are gainfully employed in other occupations that preclude them from spending a lot of time with their investees.”

Syndicates help to spread risk as well as to reduce risk. Within a syndicate, members are able to draw upon the knowledge and experience of co-investors in both the evaluation and monitoring of investments. Co-investment also allows for diversification and limits exposure to individual investments. It also helps the firms receive sufficient capital to undertake a significant growth strategy without being undercapitalized. According to some participants:

“It is sort of plasma like ... the same group sort of follows along, people come in and go out, it is reasonably ad hoc. The way it works with me is that if I get involved in a project to the point that I'm content to be a lead investor, it doesn't take very long before you drum up the usual suspects to come along. There is a nucleus.”

“Every syndication needs a leader and I think that, that's how it starts. I am involved in a variety of these and typically there is a group who have followed my investing, and it all comes down to networks I think.”

“We do business with people who we know, and have done business with. We will take a yield less than we can from a stranger to do business with a friend just because we know that everyone's going to keep their hands on the table and are not taking the risk.”

“The ones I run into are generally referrals from business associates ... or a guy I've invested with before is interested in investing and wants to know if I'll take a look at a proposal. For most of us it's a matter of having more guys [investors] looking at the proposal – trying to reduce our risk.”

“Je me suis bâtie un réseau informel de personnes qui investissent et qui acceptent de communiquer leurs informations. Ces personnes font souvent les analyses préliminaires de la valeur des projets et nous investissons soit seuls, soit en groupe.”

“Syndication is something that I love to do. Many deals I won't even do unless they're syndicated, because that way I get other people who not only money, but have an opinion. And it's a way I can sort of get the most important deals.”

A number of investors commented specifically about differences between formal versus informal syndicates or networks. Most investors speak about their networks as being very informal, having a core group or a leader who “rounds up the usual suspects” to look at a deal. As one investor noted, if the investor does not find the formal networks useful, he will simply not use them. In general, Canadian informal investors do not find that formal syndication works nearly as well as informal, fluid, project-based syndicates:

“When I was talking syndication I was talking about something considerably less formal. If I’m going to go and put a little bit of money in something, I work with a couple of people, I know. I trust with them, and I just call up a couple of my buddies and say, ‘Oh listen, here’s the deal. Tell me, am I... missing something here? Does this make sense? Okay, I’ll put some of my money if you put some of your money in.’ It just means that I can take my money and spread it a little bit further and get a second opinion.”

“...in essence you are trying to syndicate a venture capital group and you are putting together a whole bunch of different investors with different points of view. It is not easy.”

“If you have a formal venture capital pool you’d scare people off. You have a meeting and get together ... that helps and so simply making the connections from one person to another so that they end up doing some deals later on. That’s all it really takes is a simple introduction and a lot people would carry it on from there.”

“I’m not sure what the definition of syndication is. If it means another overhead level that concerns me.”

Discussion

Private investors across Canada consistently mention that they are looking for investment opportunities (a) with the right people, (b) with market potential, and (c) where they can add significant value. These three factors were mentioned as key in every focus group held during the course of this project. To this end, networking provides a means of facilitating all three of these objectives. It does so through two essential mechanisms.

First, networking is important in this study as a means by which informal investors learn about investment opportunities. In this aspect, the results of this study agree with the results reported by Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, p.144). However, it is difficult to agree with Van Osnabrugge and Robinson’s statement (p.144) that “Business Angels tend to look for investing opportunities in an ad hoc, unscientific manner”. The data in this study reveal just the opposite picture: the use of networking and referrals by business angels is an important aspect of their due diligence system. Who the referral comes from and what the person making the referral says about it are key components in the due diligence that informal investors undertake. To refer to the use of networks and referral as unscientific and random seems to miss a very important

aspect of what is actually happening in the informal investment process. Of course, this may only be true in Canada, but it does seem that some further research on this issue is warranted.

The second role of networks disclosed in this study is the significant role they play in helping to form and preserve syndicates so that investors can participate with other investors in doing a deal. The results reported in Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000, pp.43-46) present a similar picture about syndication. The results reported in Mason and Harrison (1996), however, suggest that syndication is much less common in the UK.

While more than a third of Canadian investors prefer not to use syndicates, evidence from the US suggests that the creation of relatively formal angel syndicates is a key step in the evolution of the supply side of the informal investment marketplace. Such syndicates offer advantages to angels and to society (as well as to the firms that receive investment). Syndicates potentially play a role in increasing the sophistication of private investors and in better marshalling the risk capital they hold available. To the extent that Canada's trading partners develop such syndicates, Canada must follow suit to compete.

Perhaps the differences observed between Canadian and US practices arise in part from the legal status of syndication in Canada. Current legislative regimes may work against the development of angel groups in Canada, for two reasons.

First, most regulatory regimes in Canada do not employ the "accredited investor" concept which is normal practice in the US. According to this regulation, investors in the US can self-declare as sophisticated, thereby allowing the firms in which they might invest to be exempt from prospectus requirements. Compliance with Canadian law is therefore relatively more costly, militating against both smaller investments and the syndication of smaller investments to establish a larger pool of capital.

Second, according to most Canadian regulatory practices, individuals are not permitted to advocate for an investment or to provide investment advice unless they are registered as an

investment advisor (“limited market dealer”) with the appropriate securities regulatory body. This potentially places the leader of an informal syndicate of smaller investors in legal limbo. In short, most provincial securities legislation and regulations do not take into account the syndication practices of informal investors. These problems have been recognized by the Ontario Securities Commission which is now in the process of amending its regulations surrounding prospectus exemptions. There seems to be a clear need for continued and more widespread reform in this regard and for more research to examine further the practices and patterns of informal investors in Canada.

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Table 1: Examples of Formal Angel Syndicates

	Nashua Breakfast Club (New Hampshire, USA)	St. Louis Angel Network (St. Louis, USA)	Walnut Ventures (Massachusetts, USA)
Founded	1980's	1999	1997
Number of Members	4 founders; 22 associates	25 to 50	19
Investment Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technology ventures but based on “people, not product” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technology-, life-sciences-based, “scaleable” opportunities. Requires a member “champion”. Seek “management team” concept 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires member to be a champion. Focus on people, not on technology.
Value added	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funding and mentoring: “all failures are marketing failures” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management team and funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stay involved with firm and with each other. Networking among angels an explicit goal.
Portfolio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Approximately 12 deals per year; 7-9 year holding period 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10-20 	N/A

Chart 1: Investors' Occupations




Chart 2: Frequency of Private Investments




Chart 3: Investment Patterns: Sectoral Breakdown




Chart 4: Investment Patterns: Stage of Investments

